

CHINA AND THE BALKANS

*The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente**

By DANIEL TRETIK

DURING the past several years, changes have occurred within the Communist *bloc* which have led to important institutional and political developments. A prominent example of these changes has been the shift in economic and political ties which characterised Albania's relations with the Soviet Union. The Albanians have joined with the Chinese to form the first apparently successful fraction within the Communist world despite great geographic separation and strong Russian coercion. Notwithstanding harsh Russian political and economic pressure, the leaderships of China and of Albania have persisted in their rigidity. It remains to be seen what factors led to this unusual *entente* within an international movement which China and Albania have continuously maintained must be characterised by "steel-like unity." For ironically, through their actions, they have definitely weakened that unity. It is the purpose herein to describe what issues and events in Soviet-Albanian relations caused Albania to turn to the CPR for major political and economic support,¹ as well as to show how the accession of a small ally in Eastern Europe has proved to be of importance to the Chinese.

THE CHINESE AND ALBANIA

Chinese foreign policy in recent years has taken on an increasingly global character. Yet, the relations of China with the rest of the

* This article is the product of research as a graduate student at Harvard University and as a member of the research staff at the Center of International Studies at M.I.T. I am grateful to Professor William E. Griffith for his generous permission to use some of the material cited herein, and to Mr. Peter Prifti for his translations of Albanian sources.

¹ The Russian Albanian Trade pact for 1961, signed earlier than most previous ones, anticipated a 7 per cent. increase in trade between the two countries. However, there has been little or no information in the Albanian press about the arrival of Russian ships at Durrës, although this used to occur frequently. (See, for example, Tirana Radio, Home Service, August 2, 1955, and Tirana Radio, Home Service, December 9, 1955.) Reports from Western observers in Italy in summer 1961 noted increased purchases there of capital goods normally bought from the Soviet Union. The cash to purchase these items has doubtless come from the Chinese. Moreover, the Canadian Minister of Agriculture announced in the summer of 1961 that 6,000 tons of Canadian wheat purchased by the CPR in Canada were being sent to Albania directly.

Communist world remain the most important component of total policy. Relations with the "fraternal" Communist states have led to a whole series of state and Party problems, focusing particularly around the relationship of the CPR to the Soviet Union. As that relationship has grown in complexity, and the *bloc* itself evolved from a monolithic group to an increasingly polycentric one, the Chinese must have realised that the benefits which might accrue to them from obtaining reliable support from other Communist Parties—especially when support of the Chinese meant opposition to the Russians—would prove to be particularly great. Despite various forays into the affairs of East Europe the Chinese have thus far only succeeded in gaining the firm alliance of the Albanian Labour (Communist) Party.

The foundations for this alliance were probably not laid as early as the period of the aftermath of the Hungarian and Polish revolutions, but rather evolved as a reaction to differences with the Russians, particularly after the December 1957 Moscow Conference. While the Albanian leadership may have been anxious to gain some support from the Chinese as a counter-balance to Russian enmity, the evidence suggests that the Albanians would have preferred to continue to rely more on Russia than China. However, Russian negative pressure and Chinese positive action did not permit the luxury of this middle course. When the Albanians were forced to take a final decision, they did so in favour of the Chinese.

There were several issues which drew the Chinese to Albania. The Russians' favouring of Marshal Tito was held by China to be extremely dangerous on more than one count. First, the Chinese considered the toleration of Yugoslav doctrinal heresies a dangerous precedent for the *bloc* to make. They, like the Albanians (although for different reasons), thus considered it unwise for the Russians to have made the *rapprochement* with Marshal Tito in 1955. But, like the Albanians, they reluctantly acquiesced in the policy-shift, only to lead the assault on Tito in the aftermath of the Hungarian and Polish revolutions. Secondly, the Chinese saw the Yugoslavs as a competitor in obtaining Russian economic assistance. The Russians, traditionally interested in maintaining strong political influence in the Balkans, sought to regain that influence in the post-Stalin era by judiciously rationing out their assistance to the prime Balkan power, Yugoslavia. Thus, the Yugoslavs obtained funds which might have gone to the Chinese. Thirdly, the Chinese felt that the Yugoslavs were working against what the CPR leadership felt were the best interests of the Communist world in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Just as the Yugoslav model was considered to be a divisive force in Eastern Europe, the Chinese held that in the underdeveloped areas it might lessen the

chances for Communist victories. Hence, the Chinese from 1958 increased their attacks against the Yugoslavs' policy toward the neutral states.

Just as the Albanians have had frictions in their economic dealings with the Russians (see below), so have the Chinese. The particular relevance of oil to the Sino-Albanian alliance is discussed later; safe to say that the fact that the Chinese have had to rely heavily on the Soviet Union for many types of capital goods and raw materials has made it increasingly imperative as Sino-Soviet difficulties have increased for the Chinese to seek alternative sources of supply of various goods, within and without the *bloc*. From the Albanians, the Chinese could gain and have obtained alternative sources of supply for oil, copper and chrome.

During the past several years there has undoubtedly been a constant increase in Communist Chinese messianism. The Peking leadership has attempted to force its views upon the Communist world and has expanded its role as an active revolutionary force in the non-Communist areas as well. Even if there had been no Yugoslavia, no Sino-Soviet friction, no Russo-Albanian differences, the Chinese might have been just as anxious to gain allies or reliable friends within the Communist world. However, because these problems did exist, the Chinese found it less difficult than it might otherwise have been to satisfy Albanian desires, as well as their own.

RUSSO-ALBANIAN RELATIONS

The security of Russian interests in the Balkans has long been a prime goal of Soviet as well as Czarist foreign policy. During the Stalin era, the Russians' interests temporarily suffered as a result of the break with Tito. In order to maintain a certain amount of indirect pressure on the Yugoslav leader (as well as gain a naval and raw material base on the Adriatic) the Russians gave assistance to the Albanian Communist régime. However, with Stalin's demise, Russian policy reverted to attempting to deal with Marshal Tito's government once again. This shift in policy led to great uneasiness within the leadership of the Albanian Communist Party, almost from the beginning of the Khrushchev era. As a result, the Albanian Government, from late 1954, became involved in an ever-intensifying search for support against any Russian moves which may or may not have been correctly interpreted by the Albanians as sacrificing their interests in favour of Russo-Yugoslav ties. This quest has led to today's important Sino-Albanian *entente*.

From 1955 to 1959, there was a gradual but unmistakable shift in Albania's foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the two major powers of the Communist *bloc*. By late 1959, it was clear that Albania had shifted its ideological

loyalty from Russia to the CPR. For this to have occurred, the Albanian leadership must have been assured that the Chinese would be willing and able to assist Albania economically and politically should the Russians exert, as they did, vigorous economic and political pressures against the Albanian régime.

(a) *The Albanian Labour (Communist) Party.* The Albanian Labour Party is ruled by a very tightly-controlled central committee under the long-time chairmanship of Enver Hoxha, who is assisted by a coterie of aides such as Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu and Defence Minister Beqir Balluku, and several others who have held major posts for some time. It was Hoxha who led the Party to military victory against its opponents during and after the Second World War, with Yugoslav assistance. Hoxha has increasingly tightened his own personal control over the course of Albanian domestic and foreign policy, partly as a response to pressures against himself and partly, it would seem, to satiate his own desires for power. Despite the allegation by Dedijer that Stalin was willing to transfer control over Albania to Yugoslavia in 1947,² Russian assistance and support of Hoxha against the Yugoslavs from without and within in 1949–50 secured Hoxha's position. Thus he was able to weed out personal enemies led by the then-Minister of the Interior, Koci Xoxe, who was accused of being a Yugoslav agent. Strong Russian support and confidence in his régime was equated by Hoxha with an increase in his own power and prestige within the country. Any decrease in Russian support and confidence could only weaken Hoxha's position, making Albania prey for the Yugoslavs, and the Communist Party leadership open to attack from within.

(b) *The first Russo-Albanian differences, 1955–57.* The Russo-Yugoslav *rapprochement* of September 1955, the highpoint of which was the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to Belgrade, caused the Albanians great displeasure. However, they had no choice at this time but to follow Russian policy dutifully. Nevertheless, in calling for the election of good candidates to the Hoxha-led Albanian Democratic Front, the Tirana daily, *Zeri i Popullit*, cautioned:

We must never forget that the people's enemies will try to sabotage our elections. Their activities must be frustrated.³

At the same time, the Albanian Government slowly began to expand its horizons, specifically toward Communist China. This gradual shift was no doubt spurred on as a result of an attempt, preceding the May 1956 Third Congress of the Albanian Labour Party, by anti-Hoxha forces to replace Hoxha, or limit his hold on the Party. The de-Stalinisation that

² V. Dedijer, *Tito* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 311.

³ Tirana Radio, Home Service, September 28, 1955.

followed Khrushchev's "secret" speech on the cult of the individual led to "old-guard" Stalinists being forced out by less rigid enemies, largely at Khrushchev's behest. Hence Khrushchev may well have attempted to remove Hoxha in April 1956, or, less likely, encouraged Tito to do so. Testimony given at last year's spy-trials in Albania,⁴ together with an editorial in 1956, indicates that attempts were made in the Tirana Party organisation to overthrow Hoxha. Be that as it may, Hoxha held on. He had already indicated suspicions of the wisdom of Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin in April 1956 when he wrote with regard to the problem of the "cult of the individual":

Marxism-Leninism does not deny the role played by individuals in history so long as they understand the needs of society and facilitate the settlement of problems in the progress of society.

When distinguished individuals place themselves above the masses and thereby detach themselves from the masses, then conditions conducive to mistakes readily occur and seriously endanger the masses. We must say that when the CPSU and the Soviet Union achieved the great victories which led to the triumph of Socialism, Stalin began to put himself above the Party and the people and detach himself from the masses. Thus, great mistakes were committed which harmed the Soviet people and the cause of Socialism.⁵

Hoxha's reluctance to support the Russians on the Yugoslav *rapprochement* was symbolised by his unwillingness to "resurrect" the name of Koci Xoxe; indeed he condemned him anew.⁶ Because of his lack of zeal for the new Russian position, Hoxha was no doubt a prime target for removal. However, as a result of the tight organisation of the Albanian Party—a factor which the Russians have apparently misjudged on more than one occasion—Hoxha was able to retain his power and even strengthen his position after his enemies were removed. Following this consolidation, Hoxha, with Shehu and another aide, Ramiz Alija, left

⁴ The report of the first day of the May 1961 spy-trial in Tirana reiterated Albanian charges that an attempt was made in 1956 to overthrow Hoxha. (Tirana, Albanian Telegraphic Agency in French Morse to Europe, May 15, 1961.)

A *Zeri i Popullit* editorial, "The Great Force of the Historic Decisions of the Twentieth CPSU Congress," transmitted by Tirana Radio, Home Service, July 4, 1956, noted that "certain persons in certain people's democracies . . . attacked Communist and Workers' Parties and their leaders and lied about the Soviet Union and the Socialist system. Indeed, was it not the same thing which certain hostile elements who dared raise their heads at the Tirana Town Party Conference, but who received the answer they deserved from the Party, also wanted to do in our own country?"

⁵ Enver Hoxha, "Marxism-Leninism Teaches that the people are the Creators of History," in *Zeri i Popullit*, as broadcast by Tirana Radio, Home Service, April 14, 1956.

⁶ From Hoxha's speech before the opening session of the Third Congress of the Albanian Labour Party; (Tirana Radio, Home Service, May 25, 1956). It must be noted here that Soviet Union delegate Prospelov's greetings to the Congress, while praising Albania for its progress, only mentioned Hoxha's name once; greetings from the CPSU did not mention him at all. (Moscow, *Tass* in English Hellschreiber to Europe, May 26, 1956.)

Albania for the important Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. In addition to speaking at the Congress, Hoxha's group toured major Chinese cities, met Chairman Mao, and travelled to Outer Mongolia and North Korea. Three events in the trip stand out as being significant in the development of the Sino-Albania *entente*.

Firstly, in his speech at the Congress, Hoxha hailed the CPR's emergence "in the international arena as a big power"; and, most important, he stated:

A deep fraternalism binds the Albanian people to our Chinese brothers. Uniting our two peoples is the blood shed against our common imperialist foes for the cause of freedom and independence. We are united by common interests, purposes and ideals. Together, we march forward under one banner: the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the banner of proletarian internationalism.

Our peoples represent the biggest and the smallest countries in point of population, as well as the most extreme geographical points in the Socialist camp, but neither the one nor the other can be an obstacle to true fraternalism and close co-operation, and this is amply manifested by the undying fraternalism between our lands.

. . . . The Albanian people are grateful to the brotherly people of China and its Communist Party for its great help in building its future. We assure you that our people and our Party will harbour growing feelings of fraternalism and love for you in the future, and that in our people and our country you have always a sincere and loyal friend.⁷

Secondly, three days later, Khrushchev arrived in Yugoslavia for a visit to Tito; the Albanian press did not fail to report this event,⁸ as well as the departure of the two leaders for the Soviet Union on September 27.⁹ Meanwhile, after a tour of Chinese cities,¹⁰ the Albanian delegation returned to Peking to see Mao Tse-tung at a meeting which "lasted nearly one hour."¹¹

Thirdly, upon return home from the Far Eastern trip Hoxha delivered a report to "large crowds in Tirana." He praised the CCP Congress for showing "the close ties between the Party and the great people of China . . ." and reported about his meeting with Mao:

In the Chinese people we have a valuable and dear friend. . . This love for and interest in our country we saw also in the leadership of the Communist Party and the government of China . . . Particularly great is the love which comrade Mao Tse-tung has for our country. He called our people heroic fighters. He spoke with great sympathy of our Party of Labour, and of its correct stand, correct practices of Marxism-Leninism.

⁷ *Bashkimi*, September 19, 1956, p. 1.

⁸ See *Bashkimi* for September 19, 1956, p. 4; September 22, 1956, p. 4, and September 23, 1956, pp. 2 and 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, September 28, 1956, p. 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, September 26, 1956, p. 1.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, September 28, 1956, p. 1.

THE FOUNDING OF THE SINO-ALBANIAN ENTENTE

He said that in our efforts to build Socialism, the Albanian people will have, as always, the brotherly help of the people of China. This, he said, is our international obligation to the Albanian people.

Let us preserve, comrades, and let us strengthen ever more these precious ties of fraternalism between our people and the brotherly people of China.¹²

The Russians had failed to unseat Hoxha but the Chinese had already made it clear to the Albanian leader that they approved of his leadership. During the months which followed, Albania began to increase its ties with the Far Eastern section of the Communist world. Hoxha's visit to the CPR signalled the culmination of the first period of the development of Sino-Albanian ties and no doubt provided a basis of personal acquaintance for the continuation of relations in the years which followed. Of course, neither Hoxha nor his Chinese comrades could have predicted what events in the future would cause the two countries to rely heavily on each other.

The Hungarian and Polish revolutions provided an important opportunity for the Albanians to divest themselves of a heavy burden: close ties with the Yugoslavs. Whereas at Albanian Labour Party gatherings Hoxha had only been able to show his disagreement with Russian policy by continuing to condemn the name of Koci Xoxe, by late October the Albanian press and leadership was able to attack the Yugoslavs freely once again and be a not-unimportant voice in condemning recalcitrant and contrary Yugoslav viewpoints toward the Hungarian Revolution and the Russian role therein. Marshal Tito had opened the way for strong *bloc* condemnation by a cautious view of Russian intervention in the Hungarian revolution. Consequently, Russian policy in the Balkans, which had hitherto been based upon strong ties with the Yugoslavs, was checked, at any rate temporarily. At a meeting in Tirana held to celebrate the founding of the CPSU as well as the establishment of the Albanian Labour Party, Hoxha condemned Xoxe again, as well as others

who through their crimes wanted to destroy the unity of our Party, to transform our Party from a Marxist-Leninist Party into a bourgeois party and thus to liquidate the democratic people's régime in our country. . . . However, our Party mercilessly attacked these enemies. . .

Despite implicit criticism of the Yugoslavs, Hoxha promised to "further strengthen and defend the fraternalism of our people with the fraternal Yugoslav people. . . ." ¹³

In his speech at Pula, which dealt largely with the Hungarian revolution, Tito returned Hoxha's fire. In addition to noting the implications

¹² *Ibid.*, October 9, 1956, p. 1.

¹³ Tirana Radio, Home Service, November 9, 1956.

of the latter's speech on Albanian-Yugoslav relations, the Yugoslav leader redefined his nation's position on the issue of the Hungarian and Polish revolutions and the cult of personality debate. In criticising the cult of personality, Tito opined that roots of personality-cult practice still existed within Eastern Europe and asked:

Where are these roots? In the bureaucratic apparatus, in the methods of leadership and the so-called one-man rule, in the disregard for the role and tendencies of the working masses, in various Enver Hoxhas, Shehus and other leaders of certain Western and Eastern parties who are resisting the democratization of the decisions of the 20th Congress and who contributed a great deal toward strengthening Stalin's system and who are working today to bring it back to life and power—here are the roots which must be corrected.¹⁴

The Russians and the Yugoslavs exchanged restrained criticisms as a result of the passages in the speech dealing with the Russian role in Hungary.¹⁵ The Albanians fully supported all Russian actions, and also defended themselves against Tito's attack:

Our Party has defended and will continue to defend Marxist-Leninist principles faithfully, regardless of whether this fact pleases or displeases those who attack these principles. [Moreover] Tito and the Yugoslav leaders have an anti-Marxist and chauvinistic attitude toward our Party and people. Even before Albania's liberation and down to the present they have systematically and brutally interfered in the internal affairs of our Party and Government. . . . Despite the brutal interference of Yugoslav leaders, which caused suffering to our people we did not ask them to carry out self-criticism, but we thought it better to close the door to the past and begin by taking up things which unite us in the future. However, Yugoslav leaders continued their old policy of interference and answered us with slanders in order to discredit us and by using subversive propaganda and plots, to undermine our Party and the people's régime.¹⁶

Thus, the Albanians stated that they would no longer be willing accessories to a Soviet policy which permitted or supported the acts which the Yugoslavs were accused of committing. The Albanian leadership, though saved in 1956 from outside interference, must have realised that the Russians would neither willingly admit to a change in overall Balkan policy, nor would they graciously admit to having judged wrongly the economic and political conditions in Hungary and Poland which led to the revolutions there. As can be inferred from the Albanian statements, Hoxha must have cautioned against the changes in East European leaderships which inevitably had to come as a result of Khrushchev's new

¹⁴ Belgrade Radio, Home Service, November 15, 1956.

¹⁵ See, for example, Moscow Soviet European Service in Serbo-Croat, November 19, 1956; also the article by Joze Smole, "Comrade Tito's Speech as interpreted by Tass," *Borba*, November 21, 1956.

¹⁶ *Zeri i Popullit* editorial, "In Connection with the speech recently delivered by Josip Broz Tito," transmitted by Tirana, Home Radio, November 23, 1956.

anti-Stalin policy. Although the Russians went ahead, the Albanian caution in some instances proved to be well-advised. In order to protect themselves against Russian policy shifts detrimental to their own interests, as well as to be able to influence, in some measure, *bloc* policy, the Albanians drew quietly closer to the Chinese in 1957. Certain developments in the economic sphere made it even more important that the Albanians look abroad for assistance.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN ALBANIA AND THEIR BEARING ON THE
GROWTH OF THE SINO-ALBANIAN ENTENTE

Albania's economy has long been considered quite backward; in particular, its agricultural sector has been the subject of criticism even by the Albanian leaders. Such was particularly the case during 1956 when successive reports noted that agricultural quotas had not been met.¹⁷ However, the country's leadership seemed to be pleased with the achievements of the "industrial sector," and particularly with the petroleum industry. Their hopes for the latter were strongly buoyed in late 1956 when important new wells were discovered which promised to allow Albania's already progressing oil industry to quadruple production by 1960.¹⁸

Hitherto, the Russians had been willing to support Albania's economy. However, Russia's economic returns were slight indeed and the Albanian economy continued to absorb more than was returned. The new strikes of Albanian oil would have yielded a total annual supply of nearly 2,000,000 metric tons, nearly all of which could have been exported to the oil-deficient manufacturing countries of East Europe to supplement Russian and Rumanian supplies. However, in 1955 and 1956 there was continued Russian development of domestic oil supplies, and it became clear by the beginning of 1957 that the need for the new Albanian oil in Eastern Europe would be increasingly marginal. The

¹⁷ See for instance Tirana Radio, Home Service, February 28, 1956.

¹⁸ According to R. Xhabija, "Toward Great Development of the Petroleum Industry," *Rruga e Partise (Road of the Party)*, IV:12 (December 1957), pp. 42-50, the following progress was reported: "During 1956 and the first six months of 1957, the oil-producing area at Patos was extended considerably, quantitatively. One oil field has grown to several. With the drilling of well number 542, a source of oil was discovered that has great possibilities for the further development of the oil industry in our country. We can say without hesitation that the oil pumped from this source has opened a new period in the development of our people's economy, and makes it possible to produce and surpass the plan of 1960 in 1957. It makes it possible to produce four times as much oil in 1960 as is specified by the plan. . . . Thus our country will meet its need for fuel, and will export considerable amounts of fuel. . . . Besides, the source of well 542, work for more discoveries of oil is going on at Cakran, Peshkan, Ardenice, Stalin works, etc. Preliminary geological investigations show that other petroleum sources exist in these areas."

Evidence indicates that trouble developed in the oil industry in 1958; it is quite possible that these difficulties were not unconnected with the increasing political differences which were developing between Russia and Albania.

cost of shipping it to the manufacturing countries would have been greater than that for shipping large quantities from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Soviet Union would be a more reliable supplier of larger quantities than Albania. The Russians, by causing all major manufacturing centres to rely on them for oil, could tighten economic integration in the satellite countries, to the benefit of both Russia and its neighbours.

As a result, while both Albanians and Russians had invested in the Albanian oil industry, the Soviet Union would no doubt have been interested in discontinuing further development of it. In the light of their political treatment at the hands of the Russians, the Albanians doubtless realised that if they were to continue to produce oil, they would have to obtain a new market for its disposal. Albania also had commercially exportable quantities of copper and chrome, being the world's sixth largest producer of the latter commodity. By expanding foreign trade the Albanians may have hoped to decrease their almost total economic dependence on the Russians. Thus the evolving political reorientation which followed as a result of events in 1956-57 was accompanied by a slow but unmistakable development of economic ties particularly with the CPR.¹⁹

Another economic issue which has exacerbated Albania's relations with the rest of the Eastern European countries has been that of CEMA (Council for Economic Mutual Assistance). Since 1958, the Eastern European trade *bloc* has taken halting steps towards a certain amount of economic integration. The specific problem of the disposal of Albania's oil supply—and to a lesser extent, that of chrome and copper—naturally carried over to CEMA. The result was that the Albanians were again placed in a disadvantageous position. Although ostensibly prime movers for *bloc* unity and solidarity, the Albanians saw themselves placed at an extreme long-run disadvantage with the promulgation of plans for an oil-pipeline which would provide solely Russian oil for the major East European manufacturing centres within the succeeding few years. Albania was not regularly represented at the various CEMA meetings.

Hence, between late 1956 and the end of 1957, the Albanians saw that their political and economic future would not improve drastically if they were to rely on Russian efforts. It became necessary to seek ties elsewhere within the Communist orbit and because of a host of reasons, the CPR was an ideal and, more important, a willing partner. Events

¹⁹ For example, the 1956 Sino-Albanian trade protocol showed that Albania only supplied China with copper, tobacco and cotton. (*Survey of the China Mainland Press* (SCMP), No. 1249:26-27, March 16, 1956); that of 1958 showed oil as a new item traded to China, as did that for 1960. (SCMP, No. 1733:46, March 18, 1958.)

in 1955 and 1956 had proved that there was a reasonable amount of identity of views on various issues and the Chinese had already indicated their interest in Albania by providing limited economic assistance to the Hoxha government beginning in 1954 and continuing on an increasing if still modest scale.

WORSENING RUSSO-ALBANIAN RELATIONS, MID-1957-LATE-1958

The differences between Russia and Albania which existed during the period 1955-56 continued after the closing of ranks which followed the Hungarian and Polish revolutions and the formal entrance of the Chinese into East European political events, signalised by the visit of Chou En-lai in early 1957 to Poland and Hungary. Russia still considered it more worthwhile to court the important Yugoslavs than the relatively insignificant Albanians. Moreover, the Albanians' military importance diminished as Russian military policy began increasingly to depend on long-range rocketry and not on a relatively inaccessible submarine base in a country with a troublesome political régime. Economically, the Albanian industrial sector continued to be successful, but agriculture remained weak.

In April 1957, Hoxha himself went to Moscow to negotiate for Soviet economic assistance and seemingly gained several victories. Soviet aid was promised for future agricultural and industrial development. Moreover, the Russians cancelled a 422 million-rouble Albanian debt to the USSR, largely the result of Soviet loans for power stations, petroleum refineries, combines, and a cinema studio. On the surface the Russian debt cancellation was viewed as a magnanimous act. However, in the light of the economic conflicts within the Russo-Albanian relationship, the gift more than likely represented an admission that the money lent could not be expected to be returned because of the poor state of the Albanian economy, as well as the lack of real prospects for its future development along the lines previously established; *i.e.*, an emphasis upon industry in preference to one on agriculture.²⁰ The

²⁰ R. I. Dogonadze, *Sel'skoye Khozyaystvo Albanii (Albanian Agriculture)*, (Moscow: State Publishing House for Agricultural Literature, 1957), p. 2, as translated by U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS, No. 6622 (March 2, 1961); this Russian author frankly stated in a review of the Albanian economy that "the most important aspect of the development of Albania's economy is its agriculture and it is entirely in conformity with this that the Labour Party and the government of Albania are devoting their unremitting attention to raising agricultural standards."

Despite an active interest in improving agricultural productivity, the Albanian leadership has consistently advocated an emphasis first on industrial development. A. Uci, "The General Principles and the Specific Characteristics of Socialist Revolution and Socialist Construction," *Rruga e Partise*, II:2 (February 1958), pp. 32-43 noted that: "Marxism . . . considers it possible that, with the world successes of the world Socialist system, the countries which have small resources should not begin socialist industrialisation with heavy industry and for a certain period should base their economic development on the heavy industry of other Socialist countries.

character of the Russian aid that we know about indicates since 1958 a desire to see the Albanians develop their agricultural sector, in preference to industry, although the Russians also still continued to send Albania some supplies for industrial development as well. Thus, the economic and political problems which produced friction remained prominent.²¹

Despite Yugoslav recalcitrance at the 1957 Moscow conference, the Russians' prime Balkan interest remained a certain amount of control over Yugoslav events. The year 1958 marked a return to wooing Tito, despite the strong censures of the Chinese against this policy. CEMA integration, particularly in the oil industry, came closer to reality in 1958, and plans went ahead for a more specialised economic development within a CEMA member country, instead of a Stalinist industrial-agricultural balance within each country. These developments must have increased Albanian anxiety throughout 1958.

One particular event in early 1958 specifically indicated the level of Sino-Albanian tension. In 1952, the Russians pledged to assist Albania in building a large hydro-electric dam on the River Mati, to be named in honour of Hoxha, the "Enver" plant. Its completion nearing, a dedication ceremony was planned for January 11, 1958; one day afterwards the newspaper *Bashkimi*, released a text of a letter from Hoxha to the Central Committee of the Albanian Labour Party, dated January 7, 1958, in which the Albanian leader wrote:

This hydroelectric plant which we will inaugurate on January 11, 1958, has from the beginning been named after me. This is a great honour which has been accorded to me by our beloved party, to which I have devoted and will devote, to the last, all my energies.

By means of this letter, I appeal to you, my dear comrade, not to refer to the hydroelectric plant by my name any longer, and I propose to the central committee that this great work be named after the glorious founder and teacher of international communism, Karl Marx.²²

[However], under the concrete conditions in Albania, Socialist industrialisation could not begin with the machine building industry because this would have been impossible as a result of the small material and human resources of the country. On the other hand Albania began and is developing industrialisation at a time when the Soviet Union exists as a great industrial power which is able to supply Albania with machinery and industrial supplies under very favourable conditions, without the need of developing the machine-building industry (in Albania). *But this characteristic of Socialist industrialisation in Albania does not eliminate the necessity of Socialist industrialisation in all the economically backward countries which enter the road of Socialist building*" (my italics).

²¹ There is also some evidence that in return for Russian aid, Albania "paid more than it would have, had Soviet export values toward Free Europe applied to its trade. . . . Hungary and Albania always had a relatively greater disadvantage in Soviet export prices than did [other East European countries.]" as cited in Horst Menderhausen, "The Terms of Soviet Satellite Trade; A Broadened Analysis," The Rand Corp., July 27, 1960, p. 23.

²² *Bashkimi*, January 12, 1958, p. 1.

Needless to say, Hoxha's request was accepted by the central committee. This apparently isolated incident would seem to have been another piece of evidence of Russian displeasure with Hoxha, and of the latter's reluctance to give in to Soviet pressure until the last possible moment. Hoxha apparently persisted in trying to have the dam named for himself, until just prior to its dedication even though it had become Soviet law and policy throughout the *bloc* to refrain from naming new public projects for living individuals. After the dam was dedicated, Hoxha released in the Albanian press an exchange of letters between himself and the central committee (which he dominated) indicating his reluctant magnanimity. The Russian pressure brought to bear on Hoxha must have been quite strong. Nevertheless, a Russo-Albanian trade pact for 1958 was signed in February, apparently on schedule,²³ and Russian boats were reported arriving in increased numbers at Durres in early March,²⁴ and Russian technical aid to the oil industry was reported on the same day.

Yet, when Russian political overtures to the Yugoslavs increased, the Chinese and Albanian attacks on the Yugoslavs were also intensified. For example, at a speech before a visiting Czech delegation led by Siroky, Mehmet Shehu called the Yugoslavs "traitors."²⁵ In August, the Chinese supported Albanian charges against the Yugoslavs when an Albanian was killed in Yugoslavia. The Chinese described the killing as Yugoslav revenge for Albanian opposition to "Yugoslav chauvinism and the Yugoslav revisionists."²⁶ In late October 1958, the two countries stepped up their attacks on the Yugoslavs when General Beqir Balluku travelled to the CPR and was thanked by the Chinese leader, Ch'en Yi, for Albanian support of Chinese policies "to safeguard peace in the Far East and world and oppose U.S. aggression." General Balluku replied:

We are steadfast in the relentless struggle against modern revisionism, represented by the leading groups of Yugoslavia. Our victories have thrown the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys into a panic.²⁷

By early November, the Russians, however, had unmistakably decided to attempt to effectuate a new rapprochement with the Yugoslavs. At a reception in Moscow for Gomulka, the First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, Premier Khrushchev, though mildly attacking Yugoslav revisionism, expressed hope that future Russo-Yugoslav

²³ Tirana Radio, Home Service, February 18, 1958.

²⁴ *Bashkimi*, March 7, 1958, p. 1.

²⁵ Tirana Radio, Home Service, June 25, 1958.

²⁶ Quoted from *Pei-ching Jih-pao (Peking Daily)*, August 19, 1958, by NCNA in English Morse to Jakarta, August 19, 1958.

²⁷ Peking, NCNA, Radioteletype in English to West and North Europe, October 29, 1958; see also, Peking, NCNA in English Morse to Jakarta, October 30, 1958.

relations would be amiable. The Russians could not tolerate the Albanian willingness to support the Chinese in their developing ideological struggle with themselves, even though they apparently were willing to continue to support the Albanian economy to a limited extent and would have countenanced Hoxha's continued leadership of the Albanian Government and Party. On the other hand, the Chinese, as has already been noted, doubtless placed much value on obtaining an Albanian ally for support against the Russians. Thus there began in late December 1958 an important series of events, beginning with Hoxha travelling to Moscow, unannounced, in December 1958 and culminating in Khrushchev's trip to Albania in May-June 1959. While the Russians exerted great pressure on the Albanians during this period, the Albanian hierarchy, with few exceptions, did not yield, nor evidently has it done so since.

THE CRISIS PERIOD: DECEMBER 1958-JUNE 1959

By mid-December, although the Russians apparently had been willing to continue to support the Albanian economy, the hyper-sensitive Albanian leadership would not tolerate any compromise on the Yugoslav issue. And because the Chinese had, by this time, decided to challenge the Russians' views on such overall *bloc* policies as nuclear testing, relations with the West, and the struggle against the West in the under-developed areas, the Albanians presumably knew that they could in fact count on thorough Chinese support against the Russians on the Yugoslav issue. The Russians attempted to use mild economic pressure to bring the recalcitrant Albanians into line. In mid-December, Hoxha travelled to the USSR, accompanied by Shehu, Rita Marko and the Chairman of the State Planning Council, Koco Theodosi. Until the trip was a *fait accompli*, the Albanian organ *Bashkimi* did not announce it.²⁸ The subject under discussion between the Albanians and Russians, according to the final communiqué, was "the further development of economic co-operation between the two countries, and the assistance to be given to Albania by Russia for the realisation of the (Albanian) 1961-65 plan."^{28a} Although, according to a Tass report of the 16th, decisions were reached about the future of Albanian economic development, these were not revealed at the time. However, it was stated on the 17th in *Bashkimi* that the next five-year plan

foresees the construction of new factories, the growth of the mining industry, especially that of naphtha, chrome, nickel, and copper, development of textile and food industries, building of new rail lines and housing units. . . . For all this we must be grateful to Russia.²⁹

²⁸ *Bashkimi*, December 17, 1958, p. 1.

^{28a} Tass, December 16, 1958.

²⁹ *Bashkimi*, December 17, 1958, p. 1.

Although the Albanians received general promises from the Russians, the Albanians did not obtain the assistance which they expected. Instead, they learned that the Russians demanded ideological rigidity from them against the Chinese.

From the beginning of January 1959, until Khrushchev's trip to Albania in May, a struggle appears to have developed between the Albanians, the Russians and the Chinese. The result was that the Albanians and the Chinese tightened their unity despite Russian pressure against each party, particularly against the Albanians. While Sino-Russian differences began to range over a variety of problems facing the *bloc*, the Yugoslav issue was an important centre of conflict. Neither party was willing to back down and the lines came to be tightly drawn on this and other questions. Several events serve to illustrate the deepening controversy. First, in January 1959, while the Russians sent friendly New Year's greetings to the Yugoslav leadership, *Red Flag* attacked that leadership as "nothing but a camouflaged tool serving the policies of imperialist aggression."³⁰

Second, following their trip to the Soviet Union, Hoxha and Shehu visited East Germany and Czechoslovakia; Hoxha attacked the Yugoslavs' disruptive influence on the Communist *blocs*, slightly in East Germany and vehemently in Czechoslovakia.³¹ While the Albanians presumably hoped to gain a favourable response to their (and the Chinese) positions from the relatively "Stalinist" Czech and East German leaders, it was not forthcoming. Moreover, they were attacked by the Yugoslavs once again.³²

Third, on January 16, the Albanians signed a trade and aid agreement with the CPR primarily calling for the Chinese to provide agricultural products in return for

crude oil, petroleum, copper and chrome ore. Moreover, at the request of the Albanian government, China agreed to provide a long-term loan of 55 million rubles to Albania in the period from 1961-65. Under the provisions of the loan agreement, Albania will use the funds to purchase from China equipment for a cotton mill, a flax mill, and a glass works, and other machinery, tyres, paint, paper and other items.³³

The following day it was announced that the Soviet Union would build a cultural palace in Tirana, and give money for a new radio studio there.³⁴

³⁰ Compare: Moscow, Soviet European Service in Serbo-Croat, January 2, 1959, with *Red Flag (Hung Ch'i)* carried by NCNA in English to East Asia, January 2, 1959.

³¹ For reports of the trip to East Germany, see Berlin, East German Home Service, January 7, 1959, and Tirana, Albanian Telegraphic Agency, January 12, 1959; for the visit to Czechoslovakia, see Prague, CTK Radio and Telegraph in English to Europe, January 12, 1959.

³² Belgrade Radio, Serbian Home Service, January 15, 1959.

³³ Peking, NCNA in English Morse to Pyongyang, January 16, 1959.

³⁴ *Bashkimi*, January 17, 1959, p. 1.

Tension now decreased temporarily in the economic sphere between the Russians and the Albanians. While Hoxha went to the Soviet Union for the second time in slightly more than a month (for the 21st CPSU Congress), Abdyl Kellezi, Albanian Foreign Minister, began new economic talks with the Russians.³⁵ As a result of his discussions, a cultural agreement was signed, followed by a trade agreement calling for Albania

to furnish Russia with naphtha, copper, tobacco, plywood and other goods. [Russia is to supply Albania with] machinery for her naphtha industry, machinery for road construction, farm tools, sheet metals, grains and other goods.³⁶

Upon Hoxha's return from the CPSU Congress, he reviewed Soviet progress and also continued his attacks against the Yugoslavs. Then he announced that:

As you know, the Soviet Union recently granted us a new credit of 300 million rubles to build various important projects anticipated by the 3rd 5-year plan, 1961-65. . . . The Soviet Union also gave us a supplementary credit of 35 million rubles to speed up the development of our petroleum industry, which, as is well-known, has great prospects in our great country. . . . The Czech Republic granted us a credit of 100 million rubles and the German Democratic Republic 40 million rubles under exceptionally favourable terms.³⁷

No doubt, pressure was exerted on Hoxha at the CPSU Congress to discontinue his support of the Chinese. The Russians thus pledged large-scale economic aid to the Albanians with the possible expectation that such aid might impress the Albanian hierarchy to such an extent that it might halt their pro-Chinese activity. If this result were not achieved, promises of such aid would give substance to those elements within the Albanian Party which did not support Hoxha's opposition to the Russian leadership.

But despite the Russians' promises of economic assistance, the Albanians immediately stepped up their attacks on the Tito régime, condemning it for provocations within Albania (by using "Yugoslav revisionist agents such as Koci Xoxe and Liri Gega . . ."),³⁸ as well as being "a new card in the hostile American imperialism's game against the anti-colonial Afro-Asian countries."³⁹ The Chinese also joined in the attack by charging the Yugoslavs with being sympathetic to a revolt in Iraq against revolutionary Premier Kassem:

³⁵ *Ibid.*, January 27, 1959, p. 1.

³⁶ Tass, February 6, 1959.

³⁷ Tirana, Home Radio, February 16, 1959.

³⁸ *Zeri i Popullit* editorial, "The Albanian People Contemptuously Reject the Vile Accusations of the Yugoslav Revisionists," transmitted by Tirana Radio, Home Service, February 24, 1959.

³⁹ *Zeri i Popullit* editorial, "Revisionism is American Imperialism's Weapon Against Freedom and Independence of Afro-Asian Nations," transmitted by Tirana, Home Radio, February 20, 1959.

THE FOUNDING OF THE SINO-ALBANIAN ENTENTE

This propaganda put out by the Tito clique fully exposes the hypocrisy of its so-called active co-existence and the fact that they are wreckers of the Asian-African movement at the same time. It enables people to see still more clearly that the Shawai rebellion was part of an organized international conspiracy.⁴⁰

The Russians, too, found it necessary at this time to challenge a Yugoslav statement about Russo-Yugoslav trade, but as was usual for the time, the Russian retort was milder.

The statements of discrimination and pressure on Yugoslavia look ridiculous and prove just the contrary. The Yugoslav officials are trying by all means to prove that allegedly the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are waging an anti-Yugoslav campaign. Facing facts they resort to slanders and to employing any means to slander the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp in the eyes of the Yugoslav people. Such a policy does not contribute to the strengthening of peace and co-operation.⁴¹

But there were no criticisms of Yugoslav acts in the Balkans in general or against the Albanians in particular. In contrast, accusations by the Chinese and Albanians remained more incisive.⁴²

In late March, economic negotiations were once again held by the Albanians in Moscow, to implement the above-mentioned agreements and discussions. On March 21, 1959, Koco Theodosi travelled to Russia to meet Aleksei Kosygin, Acting President of the Soviet Council of Ministers, and other Russian economic administrators.⁴³ At the end of the meeting a trade protocol was signed which dealt with the Russian technical assistance programme for Albania:

Agreement was reached on Soviet economic and technical aid to the Albanian People's Republic for the construction and modernization of a series of industrial enterprises, on preparation of various projects and the delivery of complete sets of equipment and of materials, as well as the delivery of machinery and equipment for mines, pipes, chemical products and other goods. The A.P.R. will export to the Soviet Union blister copper, petroleum, tobacco, cigarettes, wood, canned sardines and other goods.⁴⁴

The seeming economic reliance of the Albanians on the Russians was once more re-emphasised by the Soviet hierarchy, yet events in the Balkans only underscored the Albanians' lack of security *vis-à-vis* its neighbours. Not only did Yugoslav hostility continue, but the Greeks as well were accused of committing "shameful crimes" against the

⁴⁰ Peking, NCNA in English Hellschreiber to East Asia, March 12, 1959.

⁴¹ Moscow, Soviet European Service in Serbo-Croat, March 12, 1959.

⁴² Particularly vindictive was "On Tito's Tour of Asia and Africa," an editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*), transmitted by NCNA, March 18, 1959, and carried in *Bashkimi*, March 20, 1959, p. 4.

⁴³ *Bashkimi*, March 22, 1959, p. 1.

⁴⁴ Tirana, Albanian Telegraphic Agency in French Morse to Europe, April 4, 1959.

Albanians.⁴⁵ Moreover, the Italians and Americans signed an agreement permitting the United States to set up rocket bases in Italy.⁴⁶ These tensions were not eliminated by the Russians to the satisfaction of the Albanians. As an indication of a continued Albanian quest for security, on April 12, a delegation of party officials, led by Hysni Kapo, left for the CPR.⁴⁷

Albania's fears of attack from without were graphically displayed with the opening of two espionage trials in Shkoder. The accused at the first were claimed to be "hostile remnants of our (Albanian) society (and) in the service of the Yugoslav Government"⁴⁸; those in the second group were also held to be "in the service of the Yugoslav espionage organisation."⁴⁹ Although the Yugoslavs were accused at these trials of fomenting trouble in Albania, these trials may have been—like those in Tirana in 1956 and 1961—the results of an unsuccessful Russian attempt to weaken Hoxha's position. The Yugoslavs were accused of resorting to every device to overthrow the Albanian Government and dreaming of "making Albania the seventh republic of Yugoslavia."⁵⁰ At the very least, the trials were a vigorous warning to the Russians not to trust the Yugoslavs. Perhaps to underline their displeasure at the handling of the Yugoslav problem by Khrushchev, the Albanians sent the Russian leader the shortest telegram he received from any *bloc* country on the important occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday.⁵¹

Friction apparently continued during the month of May, prior to Khrushchev's suddenly announced trip to the Albanian People's Republic. A. N. Kosygin visited Albania to discuss economic matters, but little was revealed about his trip. However, Hysni Kapo, at a reception in Peking attended by Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, reiterated Albanian fears of the Yugoslavs and was reassured by Chou that

Though Albania and China are geographically far apart, the Chinese people take a great interest in and deeply admire the struggle of the Albanian people.⁵²

The Russians only substantiated Albanian fears by sending the Yugoslavs greetings on the occasion of Liberation Day, promising that

⁴⁵ Tirana Radio, Home Service, April 1, 1959.

⁴⁶ *Bashkimi*, April 3, 1959, p. 4.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, April 14, 1959, p. 1.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, April 15, 1959, p. 1.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, April 25, 1959, p. 1.

⁵⁰ *Zeri i Popullit*, April 29, 1959, p. 1.

⁵¹ *Bashkimi*, April 17, 1959, p. 1. While several Eastern European newspapers gave wide-coverage to Khrushchev's birthday, *Bashkimi* merely reprinted the 230-word greeting of the Albanian Communists on page 1, without comment.

⁵² *Bashkimi*, May 13, 1959, p. 1.

THE FOUNDING OF THE SINO-ALBANIAN ENTENTE

. . . the Soviet Union will continue to co-operate with Yugoslavia on the state level, on questions in connection with the struggle against imperialism, for peace. . . .⁵³

This exchange was followed by the tenth anniversary meeting of the CEMA, which was held in Tirana. The leadership of the Albanian Government carried some of their arguments into the session of the CEMA. Mehmet Shehu, while speaking at a session, signalled out for praise the May 1958 CEMA meeting held in Moscow

. . . which discussed the problems of economic co-operation on the basis of the division of labour among the socialist countries so that each country emphasises the development of those branches of industry which promise the most for it and for the whole socialist camp—*providing this is in harmony with the national interests of the country* (my italics).⁵⁴

This caution on economic integration was followed by another attack by Hoxha upon the Yugoslavs, whom he termed “the main danger to the international Communist and workers movement today.”⁵⁵ On May 20 the Albanian press announced that Khrushchev would come to visit Albania on the 25th.⁵⁶ From then until Khrushchev’s arrival, the Albanians enthusiastically hailed the forthcoming visit. However, the Albanian leadership was no doubt more than equally pleased to announce shortly after Khrushchev’s arrival, that the Chinese Marshal P’eng Teh-huai, the Defence Minister of the CPR, on an East European tour, would visit Albania during Khrushchev’s sojourn.⁵⁷ The Khrushchev visit, ostensibly just a fraternal one, was probably the occasion for a strong personal attempt to turn the Albanian leadership from an alliance with the Chinese.

Yet by publicly avoiding such issues as the Albanian-Yugoslav quarrel, the specific action that the Russians would take in response to Western rockets in Italy, Albania’s economic position within CEMA, and future Russian aid to Albania, the Russian leadership could only have confirmed, indeed heightened, Albanian suspicions. The ties which had been forged by the Chinese in the preceding months remained firm. Though aided by the East German Premier Grotewohl who was also in Albania, Khrushchev was unable, as can be seen from future events,

⁵³ Moscow Radio, Soviet European Service in Serbo-Croat, May 15, 1959.

⁵⁴ *Bashkimi*, May 14, 1959, p. 1.

⁵⁵ Tirana Radio, Home Service, May 16, 1959.

⁵⁶ Tirana Radio, Home Service, May 25, 1959, for the report of the Khrushchev arrival.

⁵⁷ *Bashkimi*, May 27, 1959, p. 4; *Bashkimi*, May 28, 1959, pp. 1–3. David A. Charles in “The Dismissal of Marshal P’eng Teh-huai” (*The China Quarterly*, No. 8) suggests that much uncertainty surrounds P’eng’s position at the time of his trip to Eastern Europe. It would appear that in April–June 1959, P’eng was not committed irrevocably to an open challenge to Mao, and in Albanian eyes he represented Chinese support against Khrushchev. It is just conceivable that the Albanians may have felt that the Marshal was suspiciously friendly with Khrushchev in Tirana and commented on this to the Chinese.

to dissuade the Albanians from backing the Chinese. The Russians failed to take into account openly the Albanian criticisms of the Yugoslavs, and instead urged better Albanian-Yugoslav relations. The Russians urged disarmament in the Balkans, but though noting the feasibility of placing rocket bases in Albania to offset Western bases in the area, made no specific promises that the Russians would dignify the Albanian régime by sending it rockets.

Of course, at this date there was no mention of CPR-Russian differences. Inasmuch as Marshal P'eng and Khrushchev were in Albania, but apparently avoided public contact, the lack of comment need not imply that there was no private discussion.⁵⁸ The Russians, when commenting on the Albanian economy, talked in terms of improving Albanian agriculture in order to make the country "a flowering garden" on the Adriatic. Relatively little was said about developing Albania's industry, particularly the production of oil. Despite Albanian assertions that the Khrushchev visit "opened a new and glorious chapter in the everlasting friendship between Albania and Russia," the issues which divided the two countries remained, and of course intensified in the coming months. The Albanians supported the Chinese on major issues which the latter espoused within the *bloc*. In response, the Russians appear to have applied economic coercion, as can be seen from the almost complete cessation of mention by the Albanian press of arrivals of Russian boats in Albanian ports after the Khrushchev visit. And, most important, the Russians seem to have tried without success to engineer Hoxha's removal by using a Russian-supported, anti-Hoxha group within the Albanian Communist Party. The record of the May 1961 spy-trial indicates that the pro-Russian Albanians within the country may have expected Russian military aid, but such assistance did not come.⁵⁹

CONCLUSIONS

In the three years that have elapsed since Khrushchev's trip to Albania, relations between that country and the Soviet Union have progressively

⁵⁸ At a meeting in Moscow, Khrushchev reported that he had had "a pleasant meeting and conversation" with P'eng while in Albania (Moscow, Soviet Home Service, June 6, 1959). However, no communiqué was issued about that meeting in Russian, Albanian or Chinese papers.

⁵⁹ Those charged with attempting to overthrow the Hoxha government at the May 1961 Tirana Trial were accused of being "members of a hostile organisation which proposed to overthrow the popular government and to subject the Albanian people to the power of foreign states by means of an armed insurrection to be carried out with the direct participation of the armed forces of the monarcho-fascist cliques, the seditionist Yugoslavs, and the U.S. Sixth Fleet, as well as by the action of armed bands which were to be introduced in advance on the territory of the A.P.R. and of armed units which would have been set up by this organisation." (Tirana ATA in French to Europe, May 16, 1961.)

deteriorated, culminating in the severing of diplomatic ties in December 1961.⁶⁰ At the same time, the strength of the Peking-Tirana axis, whose founding has been described above, has greatly increased.⁶¹ Most recently, the visit of an Albanian delegation to China resulted in the signing of new economic and shipping agreements.⁶² The recent Sino-Soviet trade talks and the granting of Soviet aid to Albanian earthquake victims in March might seem to indicate some desire on the part of Moscow to alleviate tensions; yet Soviet attacks on the Hoxha régime continue.

The record suggests that the Russians miscalculated the resolve of both the Chinese and the Albanians. They underestimated the strength of the Albanian hierarchy to defend itself. They underestimated China's determination and ability to support her European protégé. If the Russians had realised in 1958-59 how far their differences with their allies would develop, they would probably either have attempted more vigorously to remove Hoxha, or placated him more definitively on the Yugoslav issue. As it was, the Russians attempted to compromise between each extreme and gained nothing.

The development of Chinese influence in Albania is, of course, only part of the general picture of increasing Chinese influence in the world Communist movement and indeed throughout the world. Its particular significance is that China has been able to replace the Soviet Union in an area that has traditionally been in the Russian sphere of influence. Moscow has been served notice that, while in the intra-*bloc* dispute so far it has managed to retain its leadership over the Communist movement, the Chinese leaders will try to find new "Albanias" with the aim of seizing that leadership and scrapping the Soviet policies which they believe endanger the movement.

⁶⁰ For a description of the most recent developments, see Donald S. Zagoria, "Khrushchev's Attack on Albania and Sino-Soviet Relations," *The China Quarterly*, No. 8.

⁶¹ See *ibid.*

⁶² See *Peking Review*, Nos. 1 and 3, 1962.